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Criminal Law and Procedure
Dale E. Bennett*
CRIMINAL LAW
SUFFICIENCY OF DEFINITION OF CRIME -OBSCENITY
Where the language used in defining a crime has a vague
and elastic meaning, it will be held unconstitutional as failing
to draw a sufficiently definite line between proper activity and
criminal conduct. Thus, the original obscenity article of the
1942 Criminal Code' had been declared unconstitutional insofar
as it punished the production, sale, or exhibition of any "in-
decent" picture or print.2 In 1950 this article was amended,
following the pattern of a similar federal statute, so as to punish
the production, sale or exhibiton of a "sexually indecent" pic-
ture or print.8 As thus amended, a more specific definition of
the proscribed criminal conduct is provided, and two 1954 cases
have upheld the article as having an accepted meaning which is
not susceptible to misunderstanding. 4 The line between suf-
ficient and insufficient definiteness in a criminal statute is a
matter of degree and common sense, and it cannot be stated in
hornbook fashion. A consideration of the legislative and judicial
history of Louisiana's obscenity article serves to illustrate about
where the line will be drawn.
INTERPRETATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTES
In State v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co.5 the Supreme Court
was called upon to determine whether price discrimination in
the purchasing of natural gas from various producers was made
criminal by the Common Purchaser Law.6 In making this deter-
mination, a number of basic principles of statutory interpreta-
tion were logically applied. Starting out with the "axiomatic"
rule that no conduct is criminal in Louisiana unless "made so
by statute and clearly described by the language of its prohibi-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Acts 1943, No. 43, Art. 106.
2. State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 37 So.2d 815 (1948).
3. LA. R.S. 14:106 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1950, No. 314, p. 511.
4. State v. Roth, 226 La. 1, 74 So.2d 392 (1954) ; State v. Esposito, 226 La.
114, 75 So.2d 27 (1954).
5. 227 La. 179, 78 So.2d 825 (1955).
6. LA. R.S. 30:41-46 (1950).
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tion, ' 7 the court followed up with the generally accepted maxim
that "a penal statute must be strictly construed and cannot be
extended to cases not within the clear import of its language."8
Looking then to the specific language employed in the Common
Purchaser Law, the court sought to determine what was meant
by the statutory declaration that the natural gas must be pur-
chased "without discrimination" between producers. Reading
the provision as a whole, the court concluded that it "was ob-
viously drawn to prohibit discrimination solely in the matter
of quantity" (emphasis added) in the purchasing of natural
gas. It was significant that all of the qualifying language in the
statute referred to the purchase of gas offered by the various
producers "ratably" without discrimination. The case was gov-
erned by the rule of "noscitur a sociis," in that the prohibited
"discrimination" was characterized and limited by the accom-
panying language. As thus limited, the Common Purchaser Law
prevented only quantity discrimination, requiring that the gas
be purchased ratably between different producers, so that all
would "stand on an equal footing insofar as access to a market
through pipeline facilities would be made available." If the
statute is to be extended to prohibit price, as well as quantity,
discrimination, the intended additional coverage must be clearly
spelled out by an amendment of the statute. Such an extension
of the statute is a legislative, rather than d judicial, function.
AGGRAVATED RAPE
In State v. Jackson9 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its sound
previous holding'0 that defense counsel in an aggravated rape
case cannot require the state to specify which subsection of the
rape article1' the prosecution is brought upon. In upholding the
trial judge's refusal to require the state to specify whether it
would prove that the victim's resistance was overcome by force
or by threats of force, Justice Hawthorne stressed the fact that
the definition of the offense in article 42 contemplates the pos-
sibility that the victim's resistance may be overcome by force,
7. LA. R.S. 14:7 (1950).
8. 227 La. 179, 189, 78 So.2d 825, 828 (1955).
9. 227 La. 642, 80 So.2d 105 (1955). For a discussion of this case on another
point, see page 349 infra.
10. State v. Prince, 216 La. 989, 45 So.2d 366 (1950), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term -Criminal Law and
Procedure, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 240 (1951).
11. LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950).
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prevented by threats of force, or that a combination of these
two factors may have brought about the female's unwilling sub-
mission. After pointing out that "the statute itself provides that
aggravated rape may be committed under 'any one or more of the
following circumstances'," Justice Hawthorne concisely ex-
plained the basic nature of the aggravated rape article as fol-
lows:
"This means that the circumstances may consist entirely of
those set out in any one of the subsections or may be a com-
bination of those set out in any two or in all three. The words
'to the utmost' in subsection (1) do not necessarily mean that
the resistance must continue up to the moment of the rape, but
mean that the woman must show real resistance until she is
either overcome by superior strength or compelled to stop re-
sisting before the actual rape is committed by threats of bodily
harm as set out in subsection (2) .- 12
The above statement of the law is so clear and accurate that
any comment would only detract from it.
GAMBLING
Article 90 of the Criminal Code defines "gambling" to in-
clude the conducting of any form of pecuniary game of chance
"as a business.' 3 In City of Alexandria v. LaCombe 4 the Su-
preme Court had held that under the Revised Statutes of 1950
a city's delegated authority to pass ordinances to suppress and
penalize gambling was limited by the Criminal Code definition.
A 1952 statute 5 broadened the power of cities having a popula-
tion of over 100,000 to adopt anti-gambling ordinances, by re-
inserting an orginial provision of the Lawrason Act which had
specifically empowered municipalities "to define what shall con-
stitute gambling." This new provision would enable a munici-
pality to adopt an ordinance providing for a broader definition
than that of the Criminal Code. For example, it could punish a
friendly poker or dice game, if the city fathers felt so disposed.
It was not broad enough, however, to authorize a clause in the
Lake Charles gambling ordinance which made the possession of
gambling paraphernalia, kept for gambling purposes, a misde-
12. 227 La. 642, 648, 80 So.2d 105, 107 (1955).
13. LA. R.S. 14:90 (1950).
14. 220 La. 618, 57 So.2d 206 (1952).
15. La. Acts 1952, No. 327, p. 855.
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meanor. In City of Lake Charles v. Theall'6 the Supreme Court
originally held that such a provision was fairly implied as inci-
dental to the fundamental purpose of gambling ordinances, i.e.,
the suppression of gambling. On a rehearing of the case the
Supreme Court concluded that the authority "to define what shall
constitute gambling" (emphasis added) was not sufficiently
broad to include the power to prohibit the possession of gambling
paraphernalia. While related to the general gambling evil, this
latter offense could scarcely be considered as a form of actual
gambling.
A statute aimed at one phase of the gambling evil is a state-
wide law which makes slot machines contraband and subject to
destruction by the sheriff.17 In Killian v. Craft8 the Supreme
Court held that this law applied to all slot machines, and it made
no difference that the machines in question were held by persons
who had no intention to operate them, and were waiting permis-
sion to ship them to Nevada and liquidate their business.
CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF FAMILY
Criminal neglect of family includes the desertion or inten-
tional non-support by a husband of his wife "who is in destitute
or necessitous circumstances."' 9 In State v. BreauX20 the Su-
preme Court held that the trial judge must consider the wife's
earnings in determining whether or not she is "in necessitous
circumstances." This decision is in accord with the plain dic-
tionary meaning of the phrase; and as Justice Hamiter pointed
out, "in order to determine whether a person is needy, destitute,
or in pinched circumstances, his income from all sources
(whether received as wages or otherwise and whether earned by
him or not) must be taken into consideration along with other
circumstances."' 21 It is also supported by an analogous line of
decisions respecting awards of alimony under article 160 of the
Civil Code. These alimony decisions should provide a valuable
source of precedents on the troublesome question as to how much
independent income will preclude the wife's being "in necessitous
circumstances."
16. 227 La. 461, 79 So.2d 739 (1955).
17. LA. R.S. 15:26.1 (1950).
18. 226 La. 374, 76 So.2d 401 (1954).
19. LA. R.S. 14:74(1) (1950).
20. 227 La. 417, 79 So.2d 502 (1955). For further discussion of the case
from the aspect of the law of persons, see page 223 supra.
21. 227 La. 417, 420, 79 So.2d 502, 504 (1955).
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State v. Robbins22 considered the effect of a civil judgment
awarding alimony for the defendant's two minor children. The
Supreme Court held that the alimony award did not divest the
juvenile court of its normal jurisdiction over a charge against
the father for criminal neglect of family; but that a showing of
compliance with the alimony order would be a good defense to
the criminal charge. The alimony award, which was a Missis-
sippi award in the principal case, served to fix the outside limit
of the father's duty to support.28
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PRESCRIPTION
Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure24 provides that
a criminal charge shall be prescribed unless the accused is tried
within three years. This prescriptive period is interrupted where
the defendant has prevented a prompt trial by fleeing from
justice or by dilatory tactics. 25 State v. Bradley26 presented the
problem of whether the state could interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period by the arraignment of the accused. The in-
terruption claimed by the state was based upon language in
article 9 which refers to the prescriptive periods as running
from "the last date upon which any steps shall have been taken
by the state in such prosecution. ' 27 While such a construction
might be justified by a literal application of the above quoted
provision, it would be inconsistent with the fundamental pur-
pose of the three-year prescription, i.e., to insure the accused be-
ing brought to trial with reasonable promptitude. This right to a
speedy trial would be defeated if the state could interrupt its
running by the taking of a single prosecutive step, such as the
arraignment in the Bradley case.
Since the accused had been available for trial, but had not
been brought to trial within the three-year period, the trial judge
properly nolle prossed the indictment. The reasoning of the Su-
preme Court, in upholding the dismissal of the charge, raised a
22. 227 La. 454, 79 So.2d 737 (1955).
23. The fact that the alimony award was a foreign judgment did not appear
material, and the court relied upon State v. Galjour, 215 La. 553, 41 So.2d 215
(1949), where the alimony award was incidental to a Louisiana divorce proceed-
ing.
24. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
25. Ibid.
26. 227 La. 421, 79 So.2d 561 (1955).
27. LA. R.S. 15:9 (1950).
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problem as to the interrelation of articles 8 and 9 which has
already been discussed in this Review.28 Was it necessary to
recognize these articles as creating separate three-year prescrip-
tive periods, with only the one in article 9 being interrupted by
a prosecutive step by the state; or could the Supreme Court have
continued to adhere to the general idea that articles 8 and 9 deal
with a single three-year prescription and still have treated the
three-year period as having run? This could have been done by
holding that the literal language of article 9 should be controlled
by the general over-all purpose of the three-year prescriptive
period - intended as a means of insuring the accused a reason-
ably prompt trial. The fundamental idea that the state must,
insofar as not prevented by factors beyond its control, bring the
accused to trial within three years, was fully recognized by a
strong dictum in the recent case of State v. Murray.29 In that
case the court clearly stated that it was not within the power of
the state to avoid the running of the three-year period by filing a
series of indictments. For the same basic policy reasons, the state
should not be permitted to protract the period by a series of pros-
ecutive steps. This is a situation where the literal application of
a loosely inserted phrase should not be permitted to defeat the
cleir purpose of a statute - especially where it is a statute im-
plementing the fundamental right of the accused to a speedy
trial.
At any event, a careful analysis of the Bradley decision, with
all its implications, points up the need for a complete redrafting
and clarification of the prescription articles of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure. As things now stand, two separate three-year
prescriptions are judicially recognized. In cases where they dif-
fer, the one stated in article 8 will usually elapse first, as it did
in the case under discussion.
VENUE
The objection of improper venue is usually presented to the
judge before trial, either by a plea to the jurisdiction of the par-
ticular district court 30 or by a motion to quash the indictment.81
The defense may also be urged before the jury under a plea of
28. Note, 16 LoUISIANA LAW REvIEw 182 (1955).
29. 222 La. 950, 64 So.2d 230 (1953).
30. State v. International Paper Co., 201 La. 870, 10 So.2d 685 (1942) ; State
v. Moore, 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916).
31. State v. Roy, 155 La. 238, 99 So. 205 (1924).
1956]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
not guilty, for the state must prove that a crime was committed
by the defendant within the jurisdiction of the trial court.3 2 In
State v. Heiman" the Supreme Court held that it was too late
to raise a question of venue for the first time, after trial and con-
viction, by a motion for a new trial. The issue of fact as to proper
venue is deemed to have been settled by the jury when it returned
its verdict.
The Supreme Court's appellate review upon the venue ques-
tion is worthy of note. If the question is raised and passed upon
by the trial judge in limine before the trial, the judge's ruling
may be subject to an immediate appeal by the state, or a ground
of appeal by the defense after conviction. If the question is de-
termined by a jury under a general plea of "not guilty," there is
generally no basis of appeal. In this regard, Justice Hawthorne
nicely stated the situation when he declared that "where he [de-
fendant] does not see fit to question the jurisdiction of the court
in limine, however, and leaves the question of venue to the jury,
it becomes a question of fact.... In the instant case there is evi-
dence in the record to show that the offense happened within the
jurisdiction of the trial court, and therefore this contention pre-
sents only a question of fact which we cannot review on appeal."3 4
CHANGE OF VENUE
State v. Swails35 applied the well-settled principle that an ap-
plication for change of venue is addressed to the discretion of the
trial judge. The Supreme Court will not reverse a conviction be-
cause of the trial judge's refusal to grant a change of venue, ex-
32. In State v. International Paper Co., 201 La. 870, 875, 10 So.2d 684, 686
(1942), Chief Justice O'Niell, having sustained the trial judge's overruling of de-
fendant's exception to the Bossier Parish Court's jurisdiction (venue), concluded
"Our ruling that the district court in Bossier Parish has jurisdiction will not
relieve the district attorney of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt,
on the trial of the case on its merits, not only the facts necessary to constitute
the crime charged but also the facts necessary to show that the crime was com-
mitted in the 'Parish of Bossier. The defendant by testing the question of venue
before going to trial does not relieve the district attorney of the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt on the trial of the case that the offense was committed
within the parish where the prosecution is had."
33, 227 La. 235, 79 So.2d 78 (1955). For discussion of this case on other
points, see pages 342, 357 infra.
34. 227 La. 235, 242, 79 So.2d 78, 80 (1955), citing State v. Paternostro, 224
La. 87, 68 So.2d 767 (1953), discussed in 'The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1953-1954 Term - Criminal Procedure, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
350 (1955).
35. 226 La. 441, 76 So.2d 523 (1954) ; accord, State v. Johnson, 226 La. 30,
74 So.2d 402 (1954). For a discussion of the Swails case on another point, see
page 352 infra.
[Vol.. XVI
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
cept for a palpable abuse of discretion." In upholding the trial
judge's denial of a change of venue the court stressed the fact
that there had been no public demonstration of hostility to the
defendant during the two years which had elapsed between the
date of the killing and that of the trial. It also noted the fact
that "the newspaper coverage was not appreciably different
from that ordinarily given to a comparable crime. ' 7T It might
very well have added a previously given admonition, based upon
the obvious facts that newspaper accounts represent an effort
to present "a good story" rather than a reflection of general pub-
lic sentiment, that "too much weight should not be given to news-
paper articles."3 8
CONTINUANCE
As in the case of change of venue, the granting or refusing
of a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge,3 9
and exceptional circumstances are required before the refusal
will be held to constitute an abuse of discretion. While a sub-
stantial amendment of the indictment will entitle the accused to
a reasonable continuance where he is taken by surprise,40 no such
prejudice was deemed to have resulted in State v. Boone.41 In
that case an aggravated battery indictment had been amended to
correct a typographical error by changing the prefix to the name
of the alleged victim from "Mr." to "Mrs." As Chief Justice
Fournet pointed out, "the accused obviously knew who Thelma
Woodson was and also that she was a female." A second basis
of a motion for a continuance, in order to secure the presence of
a witness who had failed to appear in answer to the defendant's
summons, also failed to impress the court. None of the requi-
sites42 for a continuance to secure the presence of a key witness
were met. The materiality of the witness's testimony was not
shown; there was no showing that the witness would be avail-
able, even if a continuance was granted; and due diligence had
not been exerted in securing the presence of the absent witness.
36. State v. Roberson, 159 La. 562, 105 So. 621 (1925) and other cases cited
in footnote by court.
37. 226 La. 441, 448, 76 So.2d 523, 525 (1954).
38. State v. Roberson, 159 La. 562, 566, 105 So. 621, 622 (1925).
39. LA. R.S. 15:320 (1950).
40. LA. R.S. 15:253 (1950).
41. 227 La. 850, 80 So.2d 710 (1955).




A number of 1954-1955 cases involved the sufficiency of so-
called "long form" indictments, filed under article 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that the indictment
"must state every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute
the offense, but it need do no more." 43 Generally, an indictment
which charges an offense in the language of the statute is suf-
ficient. In State v. Tanner44 a criminal neglect of family infor-
mation was held insufficient because it neither tracked the lan-
guage of the Criminal Code article4 5 nor used "words unequivo-
cally conveying the meaning of the statute." The allegation that
the defendant had "unlawfully and intentionally failed, refused
and neglected to provide the proper support for his five minor
children" did not constitute an unequivocal charge of "desertion
or intentional non-support" (emphasis added) of the destitute
children.
A more complicated problem was presented in State v.
Scheuering,46 where an indictment for malfeasance in office47
charged the New Orleans police superintendent with intentionally
failing to perform his duty to tender a report on two police
officers who had participated in a burglary. The trial judge,
who dismissed the charge, had concluded that the indictment
failed to allege sufficiently knowledge of the police officers'
complicity in the burglary. After carefully reviewing the al-
legations of the indictment, Justice Hawthorne reversed the dis-
missal, concluding that all basic elements of the offense charged,
including the defendant's knowledge, had been fully and speci-
fically set forth. Space does not permit a detailed recital of the
allegations. Suffice it to point out that the entire difficulty
could easily have been avoided by the simple expedient of fol-
lowing the short form prescribed by article 235 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for all Criminal Code offenses. 48 For ex-
ample, in State v. Heiman49 a short form negligent homicide
charge that defendant "negligently killed one Agnes Serpas"
43. LA. R.S. 15:227 (1950).
44. 226 La. 278, 76 So.2d 5 (1954).
45. LA. R.S. 14:74 (1950).
46. 226 La. 660, 76 So.2d 921 (1954). For a discussion of this case on another
point, see page 344 infra.
47. LA. R.S. 14:134 (1950).
48. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950) (the short form provision was enlarged by La.
Acts 1944, No. 223, p. 661, to embrace all criminal code offenses).
49. 227 La. 235, 244, 79 So.2d 78, 81 (1955). For discussions of this, Case on
other points, see page 340 supra and page 357 infra.
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was sufficient, without any specific allegations that the victim
had been killed "by criminal negligence."
Where the crime is not found in the Criminal Code the so-
called long form authorized by article 227 must be employed.
In such instances, it is very important that the Supreme Court
adopt a reasonable and practical attitude toward the indictment,
such as is illustrated by Justice Hawthorne's opinion in the
Scheuering case. In State v. Mayeux5° the indictment charged
violation of an election law provision which made it an offense
for any "person employed by the state or any of its political sub-
divisions," who has police authority, to be stationed at an elec-
tion booth.51 It was held sufficient to allege that defendant was
a duly qualified deputy sheriff, without stating that he was a
state officer or employed by the state. Justice Ponder declared,
"the use of the identical words used in the statute is not sacra-
mental if words are used that will unequivocally convey the
meaning of the statute so that the defendant cannot be misled.
The test is: Was the defendant fully informed of the crime with
which he is charged ?-52
In employing the long form indictment for non-Criminal
Code offenses it is not always sufficient simply to charge the
crime in the language of the statute or its equivalent. Where a
crime is defined in general terms, but may take a wide variety
of forms, the indictment must specify the particular nature of
the offender's transgression.53 This limitation was applied in
State v. Blanchard54 where a conviction of possessing an illegal
device for the taking of commercial fish was set aside because
the information had been phrased in the general terms of the
statute. In such a situation it is necessary to allege "the specific
facts on which the charge is based," for illegal fishing devices
may take any of a great variety of forms.
The distinction between substantial and formal defects in the
indictment is one which is rather well settled by the juris-
prudence. In the leading case of State v. McDonald55 a burglary
indictment had omitted an element of the crime by failing to
50. 228 La. 6, 81 So.2d 426 (1955).
51. LA. R.S. 18:377 (1950).
52. 228 La. 6, 81 So.2d 425, 427 (1955).
53. State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So.2d 106 (1945); State v. Herbert,
205 La. 110, 17 So.2d 3 (1944).
54. 226 La. 1082, 78 So.2d 181 (1955).
55. 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934).
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charge that a particular building or other structure had been
broken into. This was held to constitute a substantial defect
which could first be raised after conviction by a motion in
arrest of judgment.56 Conversely, in State v. Howerton57 a
formal defect was found to exist when an indictment, for the
aggravated assault of shooting with intent to commit murder
while attempting to perpetrate a robbery, had failed to name
the victim or to describe the property the defendant was at-
tempting to take from him. This formal defect was waived by
failure to object to the indictment prior to the trial.58 Similarly,
in the recent case of State v. Brown59 the defect was considered
as formal when a bill of information charged that "George Brown
. . . attempted to commit simple robbery one Leola Reese." The
omission of the word "of," or its equivalent, before the victim's
name was an obvious clerical error. The crime charged was clear
and the defect, at most, was a formal one. As a result it was
cured by the verdict 60 and could not be raised, for the first time,
by a motion in arrest of judgment.
Article 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure61 enumerates
a number of immaterial averments, some of which were sacred
language at common law, the commission of which will not in-
validate an indictment. Applying this provision, State v. Bie-
gert62 held that failure of the information to allege that the
accused was "unlawfully" in possession of narcotic drugs did
not vitiate the charge.
AMENDMENT OF INDICTMENTS
Where an indictment is found defective upon a motion to
quash, the trial judge should permit amendment of the indict-
ment. This liberal procedure, which is expressed in articles 252,
253, and 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,6 was applied in
State v. Scheuering 64 where the trial judge's refusal to permit
the amendment of an indictment was held to be reversible error.
Justice Hawthorne pointed out, however, that the liberal atti-
56. LA. R.S. 15:517 (1950).
57. 173 La. 788, 138 So. 668 (1931).
58. LA. R.S. 15:253, 284 (1950).
59. 226 La. 360, 76 So.2d 396 (1954).
60. LA. R.S. 15:418, 284 (1950).
61. LA. R.S. 15:234 (1950).
62. 227 La. 1100, 81 So.2d 410 (1955).
63. LA. R.S. 15:252, 253, 284 (1950).
64. 226 La. 660, 76 So.2d 921 (1954). For a discussion of this case on another
point, see page 342 supra.
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tude of the Supreme Court toward amending the indictment
was not unlimited. While an indictment may be amended to
supply an essential element of the crime charged, 65 an amend-
ment will not be permitted which would make the indictment
charge a graver crime than the crime presented by the grand
jury.66
OBJECTIONS TO JURY VENIRES
Technical objections to jury venires are precluded by an ex-
press provision in article 203 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure67 that no venire shall be set aside because of any defect
or irregularity in the manner of selecting the jury, or in the
proceedings of the jury commission, "unless some fraud has
been practiced or some great wrong committed that would work
irreparable injury." The spirit and purpose of this article has
been given full effect by the Supreme Court in numerous cases
where hypertechnical objections to jury venires have been over-
ruled. In State v. Knight8 the trial judge had ordered the
drawing of a "special jury venire," when he sustained a motion
to quash the regular venire. This procedure was authorized by
article 185 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,69 but even if some
slight irregularity might have occurred in the manner of calling
the second venire, 70 it was obvious that no fraud or great wrong
had been committed. Article 203 was a persuasive makeweight
in the Supreme Court's holding that the objection to the ordering
of the special jury venire was "without substance."
The time for filing objections to the method of selecting
jurors or jury venires is prescribed by article 202 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 7 which provides that the objection must
be urged "before the expiration of the third judicial day of the
term for which said jury shall have been drawn, or before en-
tering the trial of the case if it be begun sooner." A literal ap-
plication of this confusing language would, in many situations,
render the filing of such objections impossible.72 However,
65. State v. Johnson, 181 La. 1, 158 So. 570 (1934).
66. State v. Dent, 189 La. 159, 179 So. 67 (1938).
67. LA. R.S. 15:203 (1950).
68. 227 La. 739, 80 So.2d 391 (1955). For discussions of this case on other
points, see pages 351, 355 and 359 infra.
69. LA. R.S. 15:185 (1950).
70. The Supreme Court held that there had been no irregularity. 227 La. 739,
745, 80 So.2d 391, 393 (1955).
71. LA. R.S. 15:202 (1950).
72. For a complete discussion and analysis of this problem, see Comment, 15
LOUiSIANA LAW REVIEW 749 (1955).
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the Louisiana Supreme Court has refused to allow such an in-
congruous result. In an earlier line of cases it was held that
this requirement was inapplicable to a case where the accused
had not committed his crime, or had not been indicted, until
after the third day of the grand jury term.78 In State v. Wil-
son74 the court achieved a similar liberality by adopting the
strained construction that "before the expiration of the third
judicial day of the term" meant "before the expiration of the
third judicial day after the end of the term." (Emphasis added.)
Two 1954 decisions reaffirmed and provided new applications
of the Wilson decision. In State v. Labat75 motions to quash a
murder indictment against two Negro defendants were based
upon a claim of racial discrimination by systematic exclusion
of members of the colored race from the general venire and
the grand jury list. The grand jury which indicted the de-
fendants on December 11, 1950, had been discharged on March
5, 1951. Under article 202, as interpreted in the Wilson case, 76
the motion to quash the indictment by reason of objections to
the jury venire and grand jury list should have been filed on or
before March 8, 1951, which would have been the third judicial
day after the grand jury term had expired. The defendants' mo-
tions, which had not been filed until November 7, 1952, ap-
proximately a year and eight months after the time allowed,
were held too late. As to defendant Labat, who was arrested
shortly after the crime and represented by counsel on January
5, 1951, there had been a period of two months during which
the objections might have been filed. No reason was advanced
for the delay in filing the objection and article 202 fairly dis-
posed of the case. As to defendant Poret, a more difficult prob-
lem was presented. He had fled from Louisiana immediately
following the crime and was finally found serving sentence in a
Tennessee penitentiary on August 9, 1951. Defense counsel con-
tended that article 202 could not be constitutionally applied to
him, since he had no opportunity to challenge the jury venires
until several months after the March 8, 1951, deadline. This
argument did not impress Justice Hawthorne, who appropriately
stated, "His own actions to avoid prosecution caused him not to
78. State v. Vance, 31 La. Ann. 398 (1879) ; see dictum statement in State v.
Smothers, 168 La. 1099, 1104, 123 So. 781, 783 (1929).
74. 204 La. 24, 14 So.2d 873 (1943).
75. 226 La. 201, 75 So.2d 333 (1954).
76. 204 La. 24, 14 So.2d 873 (1943), cited with approval in State v. Butler,
227 La. 937, 81 So.2d 1 (1955).
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avail himself of his right to challenge the jury. During the time
he could have filed the motion he was a fugitive by his own
choice and will. If we concede that his flight made it impossible
for him to file the motion timely, he himself brought about the
situation which made it impossible .... and he cannot by any
acts of his own extend the time provided for the filing of the
motion." 77
In State v. Chianelli78 article 202, as construed in the Wilson
case, was declared applicable to objections to petit jury venires.
As thus applied, the decision means that the defense has a right
to file objections to the jury venires at any time before the trial,
for the trial will never be held "after the end of" the jury term.
This may permit of dilatory tactics, which could be avoided if,
like other preliminary matters, the regular time for urging the
objection was at the arraignment. Justice Hawthorne recog-
nized this difficulty, but suggested that the remedy "requires
legislative, not judicial action," adding that care must be exer-
cised not to make the requirement so arbitrary that it will con-
stitute a denial of due process.7 9 One writer has suggested that
separate provisions should govern the times for objecting to
grand jury and petit jury venires, and that objections to petit
jury venires should be urged at least five days before the trial
unless this time limit had been relaxed by the trial judge for
reasonable cause.80
The most "grievous error" which Was urged by appellant
after a second murder conviction in State v. Saulss ' related to
the manner of selection of the jury. It was alleged that the
names of eight tales jurors, one of whom served on the jury, had
been called at two different sessions of the court while the jury
was being selected. On appeal, defense counsel's version of the
facts was contradicted by the trial judge's per curiam, which
77. 226 La. 201, 214, 75 So.2d 333, 338 (1954). This reasoning was followed
by the United States Supreme Court in affirming the conviction of Poret, sub nomn.
Poret v. State, 76 Sup. Ct. 158 (1955). The court in the same opinion affirmed
the convictions of Labat and the defendant in Michel v. State, 225 La. 1040, 74
So.2d 207 (1954).
78. 226 La. 552, 76 So.2d 727 (1954).
79. Id. at 559, 76 So.2d at 730.
80. Comment, 15 LOuiSLANA LAW REvixw 749, 756 (1955).
81. 226 La. 694, 77 So.2d 8 (1954), the first murder conviction having been
reversed because of failure to afford defense counsel the opportunity to examine
the lunacy commission's report in advance of trial, 224 La. 1063, 71 So.2d 568
(1954), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954
Term -Criminal Procedure, 15 LOUIsIANA LAW Ruvwzw 357 (1955).
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prevailed.8 2 However, the Supreme Court made it abundantly
clear that even if one of the petit juror's names had been "in-
advertently duplicated in the jury box, this would not constitute
grounds for reversal." It is expressly provided in article 203 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure that it shall not be sufficient
cause to challenge a jury venire because of irregularities in the
proceedings of the jury commission "unless some fraud has been
practiced or some great wrong committed that would work
irreparable injury."8 3
JURORS- CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE
One of the special grounds for ,challenge by the prosecution
is "that the juror tendered in a capital case has conscientious
scruples against the infliction of capital punishment. '84 As a
corollary of this statutory rule, the defense is recognized as
having a proper challenge for cause where the juror has con-
scientious scruples against the rendition of a qualified verdict.8 5
Where a capital crime is charged, counsel may interrogate the
juror for the purpose of ascertaining whether he has conscien-
tious scruples against capital punishment or against rendering
a verdict which would call for a penalty of imprisonment only;
but the questions must not be so phrased as to commit the juror
in advance as to how he will exercise his purely discretionary
power to choose between a capital or qualified verdict. It is
permissible to ask a juror if he "could," but not whether he
"would" render a certain type of verdict."6 In State v. John-
son ' 7 the challenged juror had been questioned by defense counsel
as to whether he would favor life imprisonment or capital punish-
ment. The trial judge had overruled a challenge for cause when
the juror's answers plainly disclosed that he had no fixed opinion
in favor of either. In upholding the lower court's ruling, Justice
McCaleb aptly stated, "The juror challenged in this case did not
say that he opposed the rendition of a qualified verdict in case
of guilt; he properly said (in answer to an improper question)
82. State v. Robertson, 196 La. 982, 200 So. 320 (1941) holds that where there
is a discrepancy between the statement of facts in a bill of exceptions arid the
judge's per curiam, the appellate court accepts the statement of the trial judge.
83. LA. R.S. 15:203 (1950) ; accord, State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85
(1928). . "
84. LA. R.S. 15:352(2) (1950).
85. State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 233, 198 So. 910, 915 (1940). '
86. State v. Henry, 197 La. 999,' 3 So.2d 104 (1941).
87. 226 La. 30, 74 So.2d 402 (1954). For a discussion of this case on another
point, see page 351 iafra.
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that the verdict which he would vote would depend on the evi-
dence in the case."88
In State v. Jackson, 9 however, reversible error was com-
mitted when the trial judge refused to permit a properly phrased
question as to whether the juror would have any conscientious
scruples against bringing in a qualified verdict. The trial judge's
ruling, according to the Supreme Court, deprived defense counsel
of the opportunity to elicit information from the prospective
jurors as to "their qualifications as impartial jurors in a murder
case with reference to the ultimate punishment to be inflicted in
the event of a verdict finding the defendant guilty."90
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right of the accused to counsel where a felony is charged
is specifically guaranteed by Louisiana constitutional and statu-
tory provisions."1 In capital cases it is also essential to the pro-
cedural "due process" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution.9 2 While it is not required that
appointed counsel for an indigent prisoner shall be a specialist
in criminal law,93 counsel appointed in a capital case must have
had at least five years actual legal experience.9 4 In State v.
Brazile9 5 the Supreme Court held that two defendants being
jointly tried for murder were entitled to separate counsel, each
with the requisite qualifications. In so holding, the court pointed
out that the co-defendants had somewhat antagonistic defenses
and that the senior counsel had stated that he was unable to
adequately represent the diverse interests of both defendants. A
method of procedure that was best for one might prove detri-
mental to the other. The court, however, did not posit its de-
cision on so narrow a ground. In his opinion, Justice Moise
quoted with approval from a United States Supreme Court de-
cision stating that "irrespective of any conflict of interest the
additional burden of representing another party may conceivably
88. Id. at 39, 74 So.2d at 405.
89. 227 La. 642, 84 So.2d 105 (1955). For a discussion of this case on another
point, see page 335 supra.
90. Id. at 651, 82 So.2d at 108.
91. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9; LA. R.S. 15:142, 143 (1950).
92. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
93. State v. Holmes, 174 La. 97, 139 So. 770 (1932).
94. LA. R.S. 15:143 (1950).
95. 226 La. 254, 75 So.2d 856 (1954).
1956]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
impair counsel's effectiveness."9 6 It should be noted, however,
that in each of the cases cited by the court, the existence or
probability of conflicting interests of the co-defendants was
mentioned in the decision.
PRESENCE OF ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL
It is a well settled rule in felony cases that the accused must
be present at every important stage of the trial from arraign-
ment to sentence, and the record must show his presence or dis-
close facts that will authorize a presumption of such presence.9 7
In State v. Carter9 8 the minutes of the court were deficient in
this regard, but the Supreme Court refused to vacate the verdict
and sentence. Instead, it followed the very sound procedure of
remanding the case to the district court and permitting the state
to affirmatively prove, contradictorily with the defendant, that
the accused had been present. If such were shown, the minutes
would be corrected accordingly. 99
SEQUESTRATION OF WITNESSES
"The judge may, at any stage of the trial, order the seques-
tration of the witnesses,"'1 and where the judge neglects to do
so, a motion for sequestration of witnesses is appropriate. The
matter of excusing deputy sheriffs or other court officers from
the sequestration order is a question which rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. In State v. Palmer'' the Supreme
Court upheld the trial judge's exclusion of the coroner and four
deputy sheriffs from a general order for the sequestration of
witnesses. The judge's per curiam stated that the deputies were
needed to guard the defendant and maintain order in the court-
room, and the record revealed that their testimony and that of
the coroner related exclusively to matters upon which the testi-
mony of other witnesses would have no bearing. The court prop-
erly distinguished State v. Carter10 2 where the crucial issue in a
murder trial was whether the shooting was in self-defense, and
96. Id. at 261, 75 So.2d at 859, quoting from Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942).
97. State v. Thomas, 128 La. 813, 55 So. 415 (1911) ; see Comment, Presence
of Accused During Trial, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 219 (1950).
98. 226 La. 281, 76 So.2d 6 (1954).
99. Following State v. Pope, 214 La. 1026, 39 So.2d 719 (1949).
100. LA. R.S. 15:371 (1950).
101. 227 La. 691, 712, 80 So.2d 374, 380 (1955).
102. 206 La. 181, 19 So.2d 41 (1944).
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the witnesses allowed to remain were key state rebuttal wit-
nesses on the self-defense issue.103
SEPARATION AND ISOLATION OF JURORS
In State v. Walters10 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted
a very strict attitude when it set aside a kidnapping conviction
because the. jurors had been quartered in three adjoining, but
separate, two-room suites, with the sheriff sleeping in the hall
in front of the three rooms. While there was no evidence, and
in fact little possibility, of jury tampering, the court seemed to
place great stress upon the fact that the jurors were not directly
under the eye of the sheriff in charge. Subsequent decisions have
clearly evidenced a trend toward greater liberality. 0 5 Almost
the last vestigial effect of the Walters decision was wiped out by
the holding in State v. Knight.10 6 In that case the jurors had
slept in five separate rooms. Without any discussion of prior
decisions, the Supreme Court approved the trial judge's ruling
that there had been no improper jury separation since "all of
said rooms were in a certain wing of the hotel and that the
jurors were locked in and guarded by a Deputy Sheriff, being
at the end of the hall of said wing all during the night."' 07 The
distinction, if any, between the jury handling in the Walters and
Knight cases is slight. In both situations it is difficult to imagine
any real possibility of jury tampering, and no reversible error
would appear to have been committed.
INSANITY - APPOINTMENT OF LUNACY COMMISSION
Articles 267 and 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pro-
vide that a court "may appoint" a lunacy commission where
either present insanity as a bar to trial or insanity at the time
of the crime is urged by the defense. 08 It is significant that
the appointment of the commission is discretionary with the
trial judge. In State v. Johnson'09 the Supreme Court upheld
103. Id. at 190, 19 So.2d at 44: "The ruling of the trial judge in permitting
these three witnesses to remain in the courtroom and hear and see what transpired
for all practical purposes deprived the accused of his right to cross-examine them."
104. 135 La. 1070, 66 So. 364 (1914).
105. Comment, 15 LoUIsIANA LAW REvIEw 446 (1955).
106. 227 La. 739, 80 So.2d 391 (1955). For discussions of this case on other
points, see page 345 supra and pages 355, 359 infra.
107. Id. at 759, 80 So.2d at 398.
108. LA. R.S. 15:267, 268 (1950).
109. 226 La. 30, 74 So.2d 402 (1954). For a discussion of this case on another
point, see page 348 aupra.
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the refusal of the trial judge to appoint a lunacy commission,
reaffirming its consistent position that the appointment of a
lunacy commission rests in the sound discretion of the trial
judge whose ruling will be upheld unless there has been a mani-
fest abuse of discretion.110 In that case the allegations of the
original motion had not been properly supported by affidavits.
A second motion, filed on the date of the trial, was supported by
affidavits, but the affidavits were not such as to create a sub-
stantial question of the sanity of the accused. In denying the ap-
plication, the trial judge "had resolved that after hearing the
evidence (taken in connection with his personal investigation
and observation), there was no substantial basis to cause him
to believe that appellant was or is insane.""' Where such is the
case, there is no justification for delaying the trial until a lunacy
commission can examine the accused and report to the court.
If, however, the evidence presented in support of the motion
had raised a real doubt as to the defendant's sanity, the trial
judge would have committed reversible error in refusing to ap-
point a lunacy commission.12
ACQUAINTING JURY WITH EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL ON
GROUND OF INSANITY
Where a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity
the verdict shall "state that it was for this cause." 1 3 When such
a verdict is returned, the sentencing judge is authorized, under
certain sections of the Mental Health Law," 4 to commit the
acquitted defendant to a mental institution, subject to possible
subsequent discharge upon order of court after the institution
reports that he is no longer dangerous. Although the exact pro-
cedures followed in State v. Swails" 5 are not too clearly stated,
the Supreme Court appears to have given a sort of indirect
blessing to defense counsel's contention that he had a right to
acquaint the jury in a murder case where insanity at the time
of the crime was pleaded with the pertinent provisions of the
Mental Health Law. Such information would appear to be very
significant, since the average juror might hesitate to acquit a
110. State v. Allen, 204 La. 513, 15 So.2d 870 (1943).
111. 226 La. 30, 37, 74 So.2d 402, 404 (1954).
112. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945).
113. LA. R.S. 15:412.1 (1950).
114. Id. 28:59, 96.
115. 226 La. 441, 449, 76 So.2d 523, 526 (1954). For a discussion of this case
on another point, see page 340 supra.
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homicidal maniac unless assured that he would be immediately
committed to an institution for the criminally insane. At the
same time, the court held that the trial judge had properly re-
fused requested special instructions to the jury which were
neither wholly correct nor wholly pertinent to the jury's de-
cision. They were not wholly correct in failing to include cer-
tain relevant provisions of the Mental Health Law relative to
the possibility of subsequent discharge of the committed defend-
ant.1 6 This information would certainly be appropriate in any
effort to acquaint the jury with the subsequent handling of a
defendant who is acquitted by reason of insanity. Partial in-
formation may be equally as misleading as no information. If
the requested instruction had fairly embraced all relevant pro-
visions of the mental health statute, it would appear to have been
wholly pertinent, especially in view of the fact that one of the
possible verdicts was "not guilty by reason of insanity."
REMARKS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
Article 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states, "The
judge shall not state or recapitulate the evidence, repeat the
testimony of any witness, nor give any opinion as to what facts
have been proved or refuted." 7 In State v. Nicolosi,n8 defense
counsel had repeatedly objected to the questioning of a par-
ticular witness, claiming that the questions were irrelevant be-
cause no conspiracy had been alleged or proved by the state. In
overruling the objection the trial judge stated: "[The witness]
having testified that the accused was present at the time the
solicitation was made, the objection is overruled." The trial
judge's per curiam stated that the remark was necessary to ex-
plain his ruling, and further that the jury had later been
charged that they were the sole judges of the evidence and that
the trial judge could not comment on what had been proven or
not proven. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge's com-
ment did not constitute a comment on the evidence; but that it
did constitute a repetition of the testimony in contravention of
the prohibition of article 384. After citing cases to show that
such error is sometimes treated as non-prejudicial, and other
times is treated as a ground for reversal, Justice Hawthorne
declared, "Each case, however, will have to be passed upon under
116. LA. R.S. 28:98, 171 (1950).
117. Id. 15:384.
118. 228 La. 65, 81 So.2d 771 (1955).
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its own special state of facts." 119 The finding of non-prejudicial
error in the Nicolosi case was undoubtedly influenced by the
fact that the judge's statement was provoked by defense coun-
sel's persistent efforts to interrupt the examination of the wit-
ness; that the statement was a spontaneous and fair-minded ef-
fort by the trial judge to explain why he was allowing the
witness to testify; and that the special admonition to the jury
had largely dispelled any idea that the judge's repetition of the
testimony signified approbation thereof. In view of these "un-
usual circumstances," the court concluded that there had been
no substantial violation of the defendant's statutory right.
TRIAL BY JUDGE - SPECIAL CHARGES TO SELF
When a case is tried by the judge without a jury, article
393 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 120 authorizes counsel to
present propositions of law to the court and demand rulings
thereon. This right becomes important where the judge's deci-
sion may hinge upon a close legal question. If the judge rules
favorably upon counsel's request, his application of that version
of the law is largely assured. If the judge disagrees and re-
fuses,- a bill of exception may be reserved which will serve as
the basis of a subsequent appeal. In State v. Turner'2' the trial
judge's refusal to charge himself that the police officer's con-
duct amounted to entrapment was held justified, since this de-
fense was entirely unsupported by the evidence. The trial judge,
whether he is charging himself or the jury, is only required to
give such charges as are "wholly correct and wholly pertinent."'
22
BURDEN OF PROOF - SELF-DEFENSE
In State v. Carter 23 the court applied the well-settled rule
that where self-defense is pleaded the defendant does not have
the burden of proving his claim that the homicide was justi-
fiable. The state bears the burden of proof throughout the
criminal trial. It must prove all elements of criminal liability,
including the lack of justification if self-defense is urged. 2
Refusal of the trial judge to give a requested charge relative to
119. 81 So.2d at 774.
120. LA. R.S. 15:393 (1950).
121. 228 La. 202, 81 So.2d 861 (La. 1955).
122. LA. R.S. 15:390 (1950).
123. 227 La. 820, 80 So.2d 420 (1955).
124. Accord, State v. Smith, 212 La. 863, 33 So.2d 664 (1947).
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the state's burden of proof upon the issue of self-defense con-
stituted reversible error.
RESPONSIVE VERDICTS - WRITTEN LIST
The requirement that the judge shall furnish the jury with a
written list of the responsive verdicts 25 is for the purpose of
assisting the jury in returning a correct and clear verdict, as
distinguished from the irrational and badly misspelled verdicts
which have sometimes been rendered without such guidance.
The written verdict list, like the judge's written charge to the
jury, is not a part of the formal "record.' 26 As a result, it was
too late in State v. Knight 27 to first object to the sufficiency of
the verdict list by a motion in arrest of judgment. The proper
way to object to any alleged irregularity in instructing the jury
is by reserving a bill of exceptions at the time. 28 Had the objec-
tion to the responsive verdict list been seasonably raised, it is
suggested that multiple defendants should be entitled to have the
possible divisible verdicts listed. The verdicts specified in the
responsive verdict statute'- contemplate the situation of a charge
against a single defendant.
HABITUAL OFFENDER LAW
The habitual offender law'8 0 provides increasingly severe
penalties for the offender who commits an additional felony
after having been convicted and served his sentence for a prior
felony or felonies. In State v. Williams'3' an issue was presented
as to whether the defendant was a second offender (carrying a
penalty of "not less than one-third the longest term and not more
than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction")
or a fourth offender (carrying a term "not less than the longest
term prescribed for a first conviction and not more than his
natural life and in no case less than twenty years"). It was
proven that he had been previously convicted, upon three Ala-
125. LA. R.S. 15:386.1 (1950).
126. State v. Daleo, 179 La. 516, 527, 154 So. 437, 440 (1934), wherein the
court declared that "the charge of the court, though written and appearing in the
transcript, is not part of the record."
127. 227 La. 739, 80 So.2d 391 (1955). For discussions of this case on other
points, see pages 345, 351 supra, page 359 infra.
128. LA. R.S. 15:391 (1950).
129. Id. 15:386.
130. Id. 15:529.1.
131. 226 La. 862, 77 So.2d 515 (1955).
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bama burglary charges, with sentences imposed on the same
date and to run consecutively. Defense counsel argued that these
prior convictions should, for the purposes of the habitual of-
fender statute, be considered as a single prior conviction. It
was contended that the increased penalties under the multiple
offender statute were not intended to follow a mere numerical
count of prior convictions, but were imposed for the defendant's
"successive failure to rehabilitate himself." This theory would
require an interval of freedom between each prior conviction
and the next that is to be counted. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, chose to construe and apply the habitual offender statute
as written, basing the offender's status upon the number of con-
victions prior to the present felony. In so holding, the court fol-
lowed the pattern set in State v. Clague,'13 2 where it had held
that the defendant could be adjudged a third offender, despite
the fact that he had not been previously charged and sentenced
as a second offender.
It should be noted, however, that prior felony convictions,
rather than the mere commission of prior crimes, determines
the defendant's multiple offender status. In order to fully illu-
strate the significance of prior convictions, a situation like the
prior crimes in the Williams case may be hypothetically assumed.
The defendant has committed three burglaries over a short
period of time. He is subsequently tried and found guilty on
all three burglary charges. It would not be possible, to sentence
him as a third offender, since the last burglary was not com-
mitted "after having been convicted" of two prior felonies.133
It is the number of prior felony convictions, rather than the
number of prior felonies committed, that determines habitual
offender status. 8 4 Once the prior felony convictions are estab-
lished, as in the Williams case, no particular pattern of repeated
failures to rehabilitate need be shown.
APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Certain basic principles governing the extent'and method of
taking appeals are reiterated at almost every term of the Su-
132. 224 La. 27, 68 So.2d 746 (1953).
133. The Louisiana statute, La. Acts 1943, No. 43, expressly applies to one
who commits further crimes "after having been convicted of a prior felony or
felonies."
134. For a collection of cases in point, see 24 A.L.R.2d 1247 (1952).
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preme Court. In State v. Scott'35 and State v. Parker13 the de-
fendants were held to have waived bills of exceptions which had
not been presented to and signed by the trial judge before the
motion for an appeal was granted. Once the appeal had been
taken the trial judge was divested of jurisdiction and could not
validate unsigned bills of exceptions. It would have made no dif-
ference that the trial judge and district attorney had acquiesced
in an extension of time in which to perfect the bills of lexception,
as claimed by defense counsel. In the recent case of State v.
Dartez13 7 the court held that even an express extension of time
is ineffectual.
A number of cases applied the well-settled rule that the Su-
preme Court will not review sufficiency of the evidence, and
will not set aside a conviction "unless there is no evidence at
all to support the crime charged or an essential element of the
crime."' 138 Also, the trial judge's refusal to grant a new trial on
the general ground that "the ends of justice would be served
thereby," rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge and
presents nothing for review by the Supreme Court. 3 9 As a
matter of fact, unless defense counsel are able to predicate their
case upon one of the more tangible grounds, the motion for a
new trial will have little success with the trial judge.
APPEALS FROM MUNICIPAL COURT CONVICTIONS
The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over municipal
court judgments is specifically limited to those cases where a
fine exceeding three hundred dollars, or imprisonment exceed-
ing six months, is imposed, or where a question of constitution-
ality is raised.1 40 In Town of Plaquemine v. Brown14 ' the de-
fendant had been separately convicted of three false fire alarm
violations. He was sentenced to a fine of one hundred dollars
and ninety days in jail for each offense, the sentences to run
135. 227 La. 198, 78 So.2d 832 (1955).
136. 227 La. 916, 80 So.2d 863 (1955).
137. 222 La. 9, 62 So.2d 83 (1952) critically analyzed in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Criminal Procedure, 14
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 243 (1953).
138. State v. Heiman, 227 La. 235, 79 So.2d 78 (1955) ; State v. Labat, 226
La. 201, 75 So.2d 333, 342 (1954); State v. Fitzgerald, 226 La. 801, 77 So.2d 400(1954).
139. State v. Heiman, 227 La. 235, 79 So.2d 78 (1955). For discussions of this
case on other points, see pages 340, 342 supra.
140 LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
141. 226 La. 642, 76 So.2d 915 (1954).
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consecutively. In dismissing an appeal the court held that it
did not have appellate jurisdiction on the basis of any of the
individual sentences, and that the consecutive sentences of the
three convictions could not be cumulated so as to provide the
requisite jurisdictional term.
Two 1954 cases held that the penalty actually imposed, and
not the maximum penalty which might have been imposed, de-
termined the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 142
APPEAL - FROM JUDGMENT FORFEITING BAIL BOND
In misdemeanor convictions the defendant's right of appeal
to the Supreme Court is dependent upon the penalty actually
imposed, which must be in excess of a three hundred dollar fine
or a six months prison sentence. 148 State v. Shelton44 involved
an appeal from a judgment forfeiting a bail bond. The defend-
ant had pleaded guilty to a charge of drunken and reckless driv-
ing, and had been released on bond pending sentence. When the
defendant failed to appear for sentencing his bail bond was or-
dered forfeited. The issue was whether the judgment of for-
feiture was appealable to the Supreme Court. If the case had
involved a felony charge, the right of appeal would have been
clear for the forfeiture proceeding is recognized as "criminal in
nature.11 45 However, the offense in the instant case was a mis-
demeanor and, as pointed out above, the right of appeal is de-
pendent upon the nature of the sentence imposed. Since no sen-
tence had been imposed upon defendant the jurisdictional basis
for an appeal to the Supreme Court was lacking. 146
142. State v. Perkins, 226 La. 649, 76 So.2d 918 (1954) ; State v. Scott, 226
La. 651, 76 So.2d 918 (1954).
143. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
144. 227 La. 27, 78 So.2d 498 (1955).
145. Id. at 29, 78 So.2d at 498, citing a number of prior Louisiana cases.
146. Accord, State v. Cotton, 162 La. 295, 298, 110 So. 480, 481 (1926), cited
and relied upon in Justice McCaleb's opinion.
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